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MISCONSTRUING GRAHAM & MILLER
CARA H. DRINAN
INTRODUCTION
In the last three years, the Supreme Court has decreed a sea change in
its juvenile Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In particular, in Graham v.
Florida and Miller v. Alabama, the Court struck down a majority of the
states’ juvenile sentencing laws by outlawing life without parole
(“LWOP”) for juveniles who commit non-homicide offenses and by
mandating individualized sentencing for juveniles who commit even the
most serious murders.1 An examination of state laws and sentencing
practices since these rulings, however, suggests that the Graham and
Miller rulings have fallen on deaf ears.
After briefly describing what these two decisions required of the states,
in this Essay, I outline the many ways in which state actors have failed to
comply with the Court’s mandate. Finally, I map out a path for future
compliance that relies heavily upon the strength and agility of the
executive branch.
GRAHAM & MILLER: A MANDATE FOR CHANGE
In its 2010 Graham decision, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment forbids the sentence of LWOP for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses. In Graham, the Court struck down laws in thirty-nine
jurisdictions that permitted juveniles to receive LWOP for some nonhomicide offenses.2 In addition, the Graham Court signaled that, whatever
sentence is imposed on a juvenile offender, the juvenile must be afforded a
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity
and rehabilitation.”3
 Associate Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America.
I am grateful to all those who participated in the 2013 SEALS Conference Discussion on Vulnerable
Offenders, to Megan La Belle, and especially to Doug Berman for his excellent substantive and
editorial comments. In addition, I am indebted to Terrence Graham for sharing his life experiences.
1. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
2. Graham, 560 U.S. at 62 (Thirty-seven states, plus the District of Columbia and federal law
permitted LWOP for juvenile non-homicide offenses).
3. Id. at 75.
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Two years later, the Court further developed its “kids are different”4
rationale in the Miller case by holding that even juveniles convicted of
homicide offenses must receive an individualized sentencing hearing at
which their youth and any other relevant mitigating factors must be taken
into account. In Miller, the Court struck down the laws in at least twentynine states that permitted juveniles to be tried as adults and automatically
sentenced to LWOP if convicted.5
These decisions required proactive responses from each branch of state
governments. State courts were required to determine which previouslysentenced inmates benefited from these decisions, what shape resentencing
hearings would take, and what alternative sentences were appropriate for
inmates currently serving LWOP.6 State legislatures were required to fill
gaps where judges were stymied by outdated legislation. For example, in
Florida, lawmakers had effectively abolished parole in the 1980s, leaving
no mechanism in place for reviewing an inmate’s sentence once LWOP
had been imposed.7 Moreover, in all states, lawmakers were required to
reexamine juvenile incarceration practices in order to meet the Graham
declaration that inmates be afforded the “chance to demonstrate maturity
and reform.”8 The Court sent executive actors a message, too: children are
categorically different in the eyes of the law at sentencing, and
prosecutorial practices should reflect that interpretation of the
Constitution.9
STATES ACTORS ARE MISCONSTRUING GRAHAM & MILLER
Legislative Responses
While Graham and Miller necessarily required a great deal from state
actors, a survey of reform at the state level suggests resistance to the

4. See generally Stephen St. Vincent, Commentary, Kids Are Different, 109 MICH. L. REV.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 9 (2010), available at http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/109/stvincent
.pdf.
5. Jody Kent Lavy, Life Without Parole? No Child Deserves That, WASH. POST (June 27,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/life-without-parole-no-child-deserves-that/2013/06/
27/d3c7db52-df45-11e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html.
6. See generally Cara H. Drinan, Graham on the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51 (2012)
(discussing issues before state courts in the wake of Graham).
7. Id. at 77–78.
8. Graham, 560 U.S. at 79.
9. The Miller Court made clear that states do not sufficiently consider a defendant’s youth when
deciding whether to try the defendant as an adult. Noting that many states have mandatory transfer
statutes, that prosecutors may decide where the defendant is tried, and that judges have limited
information at the transfer juncture, the Miller Court found that the transfer decision is no replacement
for discretion at post-trial sentencing. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2474–75 (2012).
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Court’s decisions or at least unwillingness to attend to the legal issues
these cases raised. To begin, as of August 2013, only eleven state
legislatures had enacted laws to comport with Miller,10 and for the most
part, such reform has not occurred in the states most directly impacted by
the Graham and Miller rulings. While there are more than 2,500 inmates
nationwide serving LWOP for crimes they committed as a child, the bulk
of these inmates are in five states: Pennsylvania, Louisiana, Michigan,
California, and Florida.11 Among those states, California, Louisiana and
Pennsylvania have enacted post-Miller legislation. It is particularly
disappointing that Florida has not enacted comprehensive legislation in the
wake of the Graham decision. As the focal point of the Graham
decision,12 Florida has been uniquely on notice of the need to reform its
juvenile sentencing practices, and yet its legislators have been unable to do
so. One could say the same of Michigan. Because Michigan houses the
second largest population of juvenile LWOP inmates nationwide,13 it too
has been on notice for several years that its sentencing practices were out
of step with the country and with the Supreme Court. Yet, as discussed
below in greater detail, both state legislatures have failed to
comprehensively address juvenile sentencing reform. As a result of this
inertia, Florida and Michigan have all but courted judicial activism on the
part of state and federal judges.
Among the states that have altered their statutory sentencing schemes
after the Supreme Court’s decisions, only California’s new law reflects the
vision of the Graham and Miller Courts. California’s Fair Sentencing for
Youth Act went into effect in January 2013.14 The new law allows inmates
sentenced to LWOP for crimes they committed before the age of eighteen
to seek a resentencing hearing.15 In March 2013, a California state senator

10. Life Without Parole for Juveniles: States and Courts Weigh In, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS
(Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.pewstates.org/research/data-visualizations/life-without-parole-for-juvenilesstates-and-courts-weigh-in-85899500114# [hereinafter LWOP for Juveniles].
11. State Distribution of Youth Offenders Serving Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP),
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 2, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/02/state-distribution-juvenile
-offenders-serving-juvenile-life-without-parole (listing number of juvenile LWOP inmates by state).
12. The Graham Court estimated that there were only 123 inmates nationwide serving LWOP for
a juvenile, non-homicide offense, seventy-seven of whom were serving sentences imposed in Florida.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 49.
13. State Distribution of Youth Offenders Serving Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP), supra
note 11.
14. Senate Bill 9—California Fair Sentencing for Youth, FAIR SENTENCING FOR YOUTH
http://www.fairsentencingforyouth.org/legislation/senate-bill-9-california-fair-sentencing-for-youth/ (last
visited Jan. 8, 2014).
15. S.B. 9, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011), available at http://www.fairsentencingforyouth
.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/SB-9-Chaptered.pdf.
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introduced an additional juvenile reform bill that would enable convicted
juveniles to receive a parole hearing based on different criteria than those
used in standard parole hearings.16 California is on the right path toward
enforcing the Graham and Miller decisions because its approach does not
merely modify grudgingly its sentencing scheme to formally comply with
the Supreme Court’s recent Eighth Amendment decisions. Instead, its
recent legislation tries to give meaningful effect to the substantive
principles that animate the Graham and Miller decisions.
In contrast, legislation recently enacted in Pennsylvania, the state that
houses the most juvenile LWOP inmates in the nation, reflects an anemic
reading of Graham and Miller. Pennsylvania’s new legislation permits an
LWOP sentence and simply adds less punitive alternatives for juveniles
convicted of first and second-degree murder.17 For example, under the new
law, a Pennsylvania juvenile convicted of first-degree murder may be
sentenced either to LWOP or a minimum of thirty-five years to life if the
defendant is between fifteen and seventeen.18 Similarly, Louisiana’s
revised law requires juveniles convicted of murder to serve a mandatory
minimum of thirty-five years before parole eligibility.19 Both laws fail to
give meaningful impact to the Miller Court’s admonition that sentencing
for a juvenile defendant should be individualized, taking into account the
unique experiences of each juvenile that may impact culpability.
As mentioned at the outset of this section, the remaining two of the five
states that house the most juvenile LWOP inmates–Michigan and Florida–
have yet to pass legislation to bring their laws into compliance with
Graham and Miller. In Michigan, a federal judge has ruled that every
person convicted of first-degree murder in the state as a juvenile and who
was sentenced to life in prison shall be eligible for parole,20 but
Michigan’s Attorney General persists in trying to limit the reach of Miller,
and state legislators have yet to enact post-Miller laws.21 In Florida,

16. S.B. 260, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013), available at http://www.fairsentencingforyouth
.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/SB-260-Amended-8-12-121.pdf.
17. Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP) in Pennsylvania, JUV. L. CTR., http://www.jlc.org
current-initiatives/promoting-fairness-courts/juvenile-life-without-parole/jlwop-pennsylvania (last updated
Mar. 26, 2013); S.B. 850, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2012), available at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/
WU01/LI/LI/US/HTM/2012/0/0204..HTM.
18. http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/US/HTM/2012/0/0204..HTMS.B. 850 § 2 (Pa. 2012).
19. H.B. 152, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2013), available at http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/
BillInfo.aspx?i=222016.
20. Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568, 2011 WL 2788205 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 12, 2013), available at
http://www.aclumich.org/sites/default/files/ACLU_JuvenileLife_Order.pdf (holding that every person
convicted of first-degree murder in the state as a juvenile and who was sentenced to life in prison shall
be eligible for parole).
21. Jonathan Oosting, Federal Judge Says All Michigan ‘Juvenile Lifers’ Eligible for Parole; Bill
Schuette Disagrees, MLIVE (Aug. 13, 2013, 10:43 AM), http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/
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legislators have floated proposals that suggest indifference to the Supreme
Court’s rulings. For example, the Senate Criminal Justice Committee
recently voted to approve a law that would impose a new sentencing
scheme requiring judges, if deciding against a life sentence, to impose a
minimum sentence of fifty years for a juvenile convicted of murder. 22
Juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses would serve a maximum of
fifty years.23 Other states have enacted legislation that allows LWOP but
sets a mandatory minimum for a juvenile defendant convicted of murder,
ranging from twenty-five to forty years.24
There are at least two problems with the kind of legislation enacted in
Pennsylvania and proposed in Florida. First, it may be that a fifty or even a
thirty-five-year sentence is effectively the same thing as a life sentence
and thereby unconstitutional under Graham and Miller, especially if the
sentence is fifty years before a parole review rather than fifty years with
periodic parole reviews throughout. Second, the Miller Court emphasized
throughout its opinion the need for discretion when sentencing juveniles.25
To the extent that states replace prior mandatory LWOP schemes with new
mandatory, lengthy term of year sentences, those new laws may be equally
invalid under Miller.26
Perhaps most troubling is the complete absence of discussion among
state lawmakers regarding the need to change the mode of juvenile
incarceration. If the Graham decision is to have any real substantive
meaning and impact–and if juvenile inmates are to be afforded a “chance
to demonstrate maturity and reform”–then states must seriously consider a
complete overhaul of juvenile incarceration altogether. A juvenile
convicted of a crime, housed in an adult prison, and locked in a cell all day

2013/08/federal_judge_every_juvenile_l.html; see also Paul Egan, Parole Hearings on Hold for 360
Michigan Juveniles Serving Life Sentences, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Dec. 23, 2013, 3:05 PM), available
at http://www.freep.com/article/20131223/NEWS06/312230084/juvenile-life-Michigan-parole.
22. James Swift, Florida Juvenile Murderers May Face 50 Year Minimum Sentences, JUV. JUST.
INFO. EXCH. (Apr. 12, 2013), http://jjie.org/florida-juvenile-murderers-may-face-50-year-minimumsentences/.
23. Id.
24. Life Without Parole for Juveniles, supra note 10 (demonstrating the range of mandatory
minimum sentences).
25. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467–2569 (2012) (discussing the importance
and variety of mitigating variables that sentencing parties should take into account); Id. at. 2469 n.8
(“Our holding requires factfinders to . . . take into account the differences among defendants and
crimes.”)
26. The claim that Miller rendered invalid any and all mandatory minimums for juveniles is
outside the scope of this Essay, but I think the Miller opinion supports that position. As noted supra
text accompanying note 25, the Miller Court consistently insisted upon the importance of discretion at
post-trial sentencing of a juvenile. One has to wonder how the discretion described by the Miller Court
can exist under a mandatory sentencing scheme of any kind.
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only allowed to shower, eat and perhaps attend recreation time will neither
mature nor reform, at least not in the way that Justice Kennedy and the
Graham Court envisioned.
Terrence Graham is an excellent case in point. After the Supreme Court
struck down his LWOP sentence in 2010, Mr. Graham received a resentencing hearing and a new sentence of twenty-five years. Because of
his time served to date, he will be released in twelve years at the age of
thirty-eight if, as he says, he can “make it out.”27 Like many juvenile
inmates serving lengthy sentences, Mr. Graham does not have access to
educational or vocational opportunities.28 Occasionally, if he is lucky, Mr.
Graham can visit the prison library, but for the most part, he is left to pass
the hours with fellow inmates in the recreation pavilion where even a
chess game can be a risky undertaking. As he explains, Mr. Graham may
think he’s playing chess with another inmate to pass the time, but, as it
turns out, that other inmate is “playing to win,” and even when he is trying
to “stay out of trouble, trouble can find [him].” Thus, the “education” that
he receives is from his fellow inmates, many of whom are serving LWOP
sentences and have “nothing to lose.” Mr. Graham and those like him
across the country currently have no opportunity to demonstrate “maturity
and reform,” and state legislatures have their work cut out for them if this
is to change.
Judicial Responses
In the absence of legislative action, state court judges have been
required to muddle through various post-Graham and Miller questions,
and the results have been mixed. For example, as a threshold matter,
courts have had to determine whether these decisions apply retroactively.29
Courts have correctly treated the Graham decision as substantive and have
held that it is retroactively applicable.30 But courts have been conflicted on

27. After writing about Graham v. Florida, I interviewed Mr. Graham at the Taylor Correctional
Institute, where he is incarcerated in Perry, Florida. Since that interview, conducted in August 2012,
Mr. Graham and I have maintained correspondence through the mail. I am currently working on a
larger project that shares the narrative of his life while illuminating the need for holistic juvenile
justice reform.
28. Id. See also ASHLEY NELLIS, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL
SURVEY 23–24 (2012), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_The_Lives_of_
Juvenile_Lifers.pdf.
29. A full discussion of retroactivity analysis is outside the scope of this Essay. See Drinan,
supra note 6, at 65–69. In general, substantive rules are retroactively applicable, while procedural ones
are not.
30. See, e.g., Bell v. Haws, No. CV09-3346-JFW (MLG), 2010 WL 3447218, at *9 n.6 (C.D.
Cal. July 14, 2010), vacated sub nom. Bell v. Lewis, 462 F. App’x 692 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding
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the question of whether Miller applies to defendants who have completed
their direct appeal. Courts in Florida, Michigan, and Minnesota have held
that the Miller decision is not retroactively applicable to cases pending on
collateral review.31 These courts have explicitly found that the Miller rule
was merely procedural and thus has no retroactive application. In contrast,
state courts in Mississippi, Massachusetts, Illinois, Iowa and Louisiana
have held that Miller announced a new substantive rule that applies
retroactively to cases on collateral review.32 Alongside the state courts,
there is an emerging federal court debate over Miller’s retroactivity.33 In
light of the volume of federal habeas petitioners who may seek relief under
Miller and the split on the question of retroactivity, it seems inevitable that
the United States Supreme Court will need to squarely address this issue in
the near future.
By far, the greatest judicial debate in the state courts has been around
the issue of “de facto life sentences.” Both Graham and Miller preclude
LWOP sentences—in one case for an entire category of offenders and in
another unless certain procedures are followed. But state courts are
divided on whether that rule also applies to, say, an eighty-nine year
sentence without the possibility of parole. Defendants have challenged
extremely long term of year sentences under Graham and Miller and have
achieved mixed results. In Florida alone, where Mr. Graham received
twenty-five years upon re-sentencing, another inmate received ninety-nine
years as a single sentence; one inmate received 170 years under
consecutive sentences.34 This issue continues to percolate in the court
system, and at least for the time being, it appears that the Supreme Court
will not weigh in on the question; the Court just denied certiorari in a case
asking it to do just that.35

Graham retroactively applicable); Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697, 700–01 (Iowa 2010) (same); but
see Lawson v. Pennsylvania, No. Civ.A. 09-2120, 2010 WL 5300531, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2010).
31. Geter v. State, 115 So.3d 375 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012), reh'g denied, 115 So. 3d 385 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (Miller does not apply retroactively); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn.
2013) (same); People v. Carp, 828 N.W.2d 685 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012), appeal granted, 838 N.W.2d
873 (Mich. 2013) (same).
32. Diatchenko v. Dist. Atty., 2013 WL 6726856 (Mass. Dec. 24, 2013); State v. Ragland, 836
N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 2013); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698 (Miss. 2013); People v. Williams, 982 N.E.2d
181 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); State v. Simmons, 99 So. 3d 28 (La. 2012).
33. Compare Craig v. Cain, No. 12-30035, 2013 WL 69128 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013) (finding
Miller not retroactive) with In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding that petitioners had
made a prima facie showing that Miller was retroactive).
34. Maggie Lee, Florida Struggles with Youth Life Sentences, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCH. (July 30,
2012), http://jjie.org/florida-struggles-youth-life-sentences/.
35. Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Bunch v. Bobby, 133 S.
Ct. 1996 (2013).
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Finally, executive actors have been largely absent from the process of
implementing the Graham-Miller mandate. The one noteworthy instance
of executive action, moreover, was done in a ham-handed manner and
should not be replicated elsewhere. Shortly after the Miller ruling, Iowa
Governor Terry Branstad exercised his executive clemency power and
commuted the sentences of the state’s thirty-eight juvenile homicide
offenders who had been sentenced to LWOP: he commuted the sentences
to sixty year terms and instructed that no credit be given for earned time.36
The Governor’s action was procedurally and substantively flawed, and
just this summer the Iowa Supreme Court held that his actions exceeded
his executive clemency power.37 The Miller Court emphasized that
“individualized sentencing” was required when dealing with juveniles, and
it further asserted that “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to
[LWOP] will be uncommon.”38 By commuting the thirty-eight sentences
in a blanket manner, the Governor ignored the Court’s requirement to treat
each defendant as an individual and to consider factors such as family and
home environments, the circumstances of the homicide itself and the ways
in which the defendant’s youth may have hampered his interactions with
law enforcement and even with his own counsel.39 At the same time, as a
practical matter, these inmates will likely die in prison40—something the
Miller Court stated should be an uncommon outcome.41 The Iowa
Supreme court correctly recognized these facts and agreed with an
inmate’s challenge to his sixty year commuted sentence, roundly
criticizing the Governor in its decision.42 Thus, while the Graham and
Miller rulings are still fresh, initial state efforts indicate a reluctant
adoption of the Supreme Court’s decisions.
A BLUEPRINT FOR PROGRESS
In the wake of Graham and Miller, the real onus is on state lawmakers.
Removing mandatory LWOP, as some states have done, is a start, but

36. State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Iowa 2013).
37. Id. at 122.
38. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
39. Id. at 2468.
40. MICHIGAN LIFE EXPECTANCY DATA FOR YOUTH SERVING NATURAL LIFE SENTENCES,
ACLU OF MICHIGAN JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE INITIATIVE, http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/
wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Michigan-Life-Expectancy-Data-Youth-Serving-Life.pdf.
41. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (“[G]iven all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision
about children's diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate
occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”).
42. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 117–18 (stating that the Governor’s attempt to circumvent the
dictates of Miller constitutes a breach of the separation of powers).
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replacing that sentence with new, steep mandatory minimums, contravenes
the spirit of Miller if not its holding. More importantly, though, as those
actors whose job it is to think and act prospectively, state lawmakers need
to explore ways to impact juvenile inmates in the long run. If lawmakers
want to make a juvenile’s release hinge upon factors such as whether they
have educated themselves, reflected on their wrongdoing and
demonstrated their capacity to contribute to society, then prison must
afford an array of growth opportunities, including classes, substance abuse
and alcohol education and treatment, and employment and skills training.
There are models for productive juvenile incarceration that are more likely
to foster reform and are more affordable long term.43 State lawmakers
need to abandon shortsighted, technical attempts to comport with the
Supreme Court’s decisions and begin to embrace the Court’s vision of
juvenile rehabilitation.
Where lawmakers have not acted, state court judges can play a more
active role in ensuring that youth is taken into account at sentencing, as the
Graham and Miller decisions demand. For example, state court judges can
rely upon state constitutional provisions to expand the reach of the
Graham and Miller decisions, as the Massachusetts high court just did. In
Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court not only held that the Miller
decision applies retroactively, but also held that even discretionary LWOP
sentences for juvenile homicide offenders were unconstitutional under the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.44 State court judges have the tools to
give substantive meaning to the Graham and Miller decisions, as well as
the ability to ensure even-handed application of the two decisions, and
they should use those tools liberally.
Finally, executive actors at the state level should ensure state
compliance with the Graham and Miller decisions. Not only do executive
actors share a responsibility to uphold the law of the land, but also they are
uniquely situated to do so in the post-Miller era because of the executive
branch’s agility and discretion. State executive actors can contribute to the
implementation of Graham and Miller in at least two concrete ways.

43. In recent years, for example, Ohio has enacted sweeping juvenile justice reform designed to
treat young people as juveniles and to reduce recidivism. See CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE: STATE
TRENDS: LEGISLATIVE VICTORIES FROM 2011–2013 6, http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/
documents/ST2013.pdf; see also Press Release, R Strategy Group, Judges, Youth Corrections Experts,
and Advocates Thank Governor Kasich, General Assembly Leaders for Passage of Historic Juvenile
Justice Reforms, available at http://clcky.squarespace.com/storage/documents/JJReformreleaseed.pdf.
Other jurisdictions should follow suit.
44. Diatchenko v. Dist. Atty., 2013 WL 6726856, at **8–**9 (Mass. Dec. 24, 2013).
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To begin, state prosecutors should reconsider charging and sentencing
policies for juveniles. For example, in some states, prosecutors have the
discretion to decide which juvenile cases should be transferred to adult
court. In these states, prosecutors should consider instituting a policy
stating that non-homicide juvenile offenders should not be charged as
adults for first offenses.45 At the same time, prosecutors should support
legitimate post-Miller legislation rather than legislation that merely
replaces LWOP with its practical equivalent.46
Governors, whose clemency power is enormous, should take seriously
their obligation to exercise mercy where it is appropriate and to bring state
practice into compliance with the dictates of Graham and Miller.
Governor Branstad’s blanket commutation of Iowa’s juvenile homicide
inmates serves as an example of “what not to do.” Instead, Governors
should consider appointing “Miller Commissions,” whose charge will be:
(1) to identify all state inmates affected by the Graham and Miller
decisions; (2) to identify a range of appropriate sentences for such
inmates; and (3) to make recommendations to the Governor regarding each
inmate and what new sentence may be appropriate in light of the Miller
sentencing factors. These Commissions are urgently needed in those states
housing the most people serving juvenile LWOP sentences, but they make
sense in all jurisdictions.
In this way, the executive branch can remedy several problems at once.
It can reach cases that the courts cannot. In particular, governors can apply
the Miller decision even in states where courts have held that the decision
is not retroactively applicable. This ensures even-handed application of
federal law. Also, an executive “Miller Commission” can address postMiller issues in a holistic fashion, avoiding the piecemeal nature of failed
legislative attempts and wildly unpredictable court outcomes. Finally, it
can afford relief to juvenile inmates in perhaps the most expeditious way
possible.

45. Thanks to Professor Doug Berman who made a similar suggestion at a recent roundtable
discussion of vulnerable inmates.
46. In recent speeches, Attorney General Holder has addressed the reality that we are a nation
that over-incarcerates. See, e.g., Attorney General Eric Holder Delivers Remarks at the Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-130812.html. These speeches should set
the tone for state attorneys general and should encourage state reconsideration of charging and
sentencing practices, particularly as they relate to juveniles.
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The Graham and Miller opinions signaled to the states a need to
overhaul juvenile sentencing and incarceration practices. To date, no such
overhaul has occurred. Until state lawmakers can enact comprehensive
legislation that implements the Graham-Miller mandates, executive actors
have the capacity and responsibility to do so.

